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NO. 2 JANUARY 2019 Introduction 
A European Security Council 
Added Value for EU Foreign and Security Policy? 
Markus Kaim and Ronja Kempin 
A European Security Council (ESC) would – so the German government has suggested – 
make the European Union (EU) better prepared for making decisions about inter-
national politics and thus better able to act. It believes that if the EU and its member 
states do not manage to take and implement coherent decisions more quickly, their 
ability to (further) enforce European rules and strengthen multilateral formats will 
be weakened. The EU-27’s diplomatic, financial and military resources should there-
fore be supplemented by a format for more effective intergovernmental cooperation. 
However, this idea can only take shape if the German government can demonstrate 
the added value of such a body, and if it shows more willingness itself to shape for-
eign policy within the EU framework. 
 
The EU has a rather bad reputation as a 
foreign and security policy actor. Europe’s 
immediate political environment is chang-
ing rapidly, yet the EU’s (still) 28 members 
are failing to formulate rapidly and coher-
ently common responses to the countless 
foreign policy upheavals confronting them. 
Even when they do make decisions, they 
lack the political will and often the ma-
terial capacity to implement them. Aside 
from a few exceptions, such as the sanc-
tions imposed on Russia following its 
annexation of Crimea, the EU states have 
not managed to act effectively. 
To counter this deficiency, Chancellor 
Angela Merkel, in her speech to the Euro-
pean Parliament on 13 November 2018, 
once again proposed creating a European 
Security Council. This would consist of 
parts of the EU membership, according to 
a principle of rotation, and coordinate 
closely with the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy and the European members of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
In the early summer of 2018, Germany, 
together with France, had already advocated 
a European debate on “new formats”, “such 
as an EU Security Council, and possibilities 
for closer coordination within the EU and 
in external forums”. 
At first glance, the thrust of this initia-
tive is surprising. There is no institutional 
deficit in the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). On the contrary, the 
EU shapes its external relations, both stra-
tegically and operationally, with the help 
of a multitude of bodies. The few German 
statements on the ESC therefore give the 
impression that a task has yet to be found 
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for it. In fact, pursuing the idea only makes 
sense if two questions can be answered un-
ambiguously: 
a. What deficits in EU foreign and security 
policy could a European Security Council 
eliminate? 
b. What added value is it meant to bring 
to the EU’s institutional structure, and 
what objectives could it help the EU and 
its member states to achieve better? 
An Answer to the Shortcomings 
of EU Foreign Policy? 
The reasons for the EU’s inadequate ex-
ternal actions are well known. First, the 
road to decision-making in the EU is too 
long. The greatest obstacle here is the re-
quirement for unanimity among member 
states. The diverse, often geographically 
driven interests, as well as the different 
choices in foreign policy means, prevent 
EU states from pursuing a foreign policy 
that is more than an expression of the low-
est common denominator. Even the High 
Representative can do little to influence 
this. Today, however, this approach is clear-
ly no longer sufficient in terms of shaping 
the EU’s neighbourhood as a force for order, 
and countering the crises and conflicts that 
are impacting on it. It is no surprise there-
fore that the EU is largely absent as a collec-
tive actor concerning diplomatic efforts to 
contain the war in Syria. In Ukraine, the 
EU states let the OSCE take precedence in 
conflict management. The military fight 
against international terrorism is led by 
the United States. Only NATO and some EU 
states, but not the entire EU, have joined 
the US international alliance against “Islamic 
State”. Moreover, since the US is withdraw-
ing from multilateral formats and related 
international frameworks, the EU and its 
member states are faced with the question 
of how to give more weight to their own 
position. 
Second, the EU lacks an executive force 
with the power to implement decisions that 
have been taken. The long road to decision-
making corresponds to a frequent reluc-
tance on the part of EU member states to 
implement decisions, most conspicuously 
in security and defence policy. A striking 
example of the EU’s lack of executive power 
is its battlegroups: they are not deployed 
because it is precisely the states that cur-
rently lead such a group which block its 
use. 
Integration Policy: 
Added Value through the ESC? 
An ESC would also have to be integrated 
into the EU’s institutional structure. Here, 
Germany needs to provide an answer to the 
following question: how can this new body 
speed up decision-making and strengthen 
the EU’s foreign policy capacity? Four for-
mats with different political ambitions are 
conceivable: 
a) The ESC along with the European 
Council: in this version, the body could 
serve to make the foreign and security 
policy conclusions of the European Council 
more visible, to both the international com-
munity and EU citizens. As the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, the Euro-
pean Council is the main decision-making 
body in the EU. It meets to define strategic 
interests and objectives, including for the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
However, foreign and security policy issues 
have so far tended to play a secondary role 
in European Council meetings. A Security 
Council organised as an informal body in 
the margins of European Council meetings 
could remedy this. Its members would have 
the task of putting foreign and security 
policy issues on the Council’s agenda and 
drawing up opinions and recommendations 
on strategic issues in cooperation with the 
High Representative. The ESC could thus 
help to raise awareness of foreign and secu-
rity policy decisions. 
On the other hand, the EU would not 
benefit from an ESC that comprises all 27 
member states. This would create more 
institutional complexity, but little political 
added value. ESC decisions would at best 
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have a politically binding effect. It would 
not speed up decision-making or increase 
the EU’s capacity to act. 
b) The ESC as an ad hoc body of 27 
foreign ministers: A variant of the first 
model would be the ESC as an ad hoc body. 
The European Council would essentially 
instruct the Council of Foreign Ministers 
to constitute itself with all 27 members, 
if necessary on a case-by-case basis, at the 
invitation of the High Representative. The 
focus here would be less on strategically 
developing the CFSP; rather, the ESC would 
act as an emergency response mechanism. 
Due to the binding effect of existing docu-
ments and policies, the ESC would not need 
to redefine the EU’s attitude towards a spe-
cific crisis. It would only have to prioritise 
EU policies and seek to implement them 
with the help of the European External Ac-
tion Service (EEAS). Its actions would essen-
tially be limited in time and tied to the 
mandate of the European Council. Using 
this model, decision-making could be accel-
erated. However, it is uncertain whether 
this would also make the EU more capable 
of action. 
c) The ESC as an intergovernmental leader-
ship group: A third possibility would be 
to design the body as a Contact Group or 
Group of Friends. The Security Council 
would then channel a trend in the CFSP, 
namely to advance European foreign policy 
both within and outside the EU through 
coalitions of the willing. Member states 
frequently already take this route to re-
spond more flexibly to international policy 
crises that are crucial to them. Coalitions 
of the willing have become a respected 
practice within European foreign policy. 
The High Representative tolerates these 
groups of states as long as their actions 
serve the Treaty objectives, and she herself 
and the other member states are kept in-
formed. A Security Council could legitimise 
this way of proceeding, and would be a 
response to those calling for political 
leadership in foreign and security policy. 
Like NATO’s Quad – an informal group 
consisting of the US, France, the United 
Kingdom and Germany – a European 
Security Council of a few member states 
who are willing and able to contribute 
could make quick decisions that are bind-
ing for its members. Other member states 
could adopt these decisions without, how-
ever, having the right to modify them. A 
body constructed in this way could form 
the core of an ambitious, more flexible EU 
foreign policy. In contrast to the two vari-
ants outlined above, this tailoring of the 
ESC would meet the objective of making 
the EU’s external action more “flexible”. 
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether it 
could facilitate “closer coordination within 
the EU and in external forums”, which is 
demanded by Germany and France. 
d) The ESC as a supranational governance 
body: theoretically, the ESC could also be 
conceived as a supranational governance 
body. As such, it would be the supreme 
decision-making and governing body with-
in EU foreign policy. As many EU states as 
possible should delegate to its members 
the right to take decisions on international 
policy issues on their behalf. This model 
of ESC would be the expression and result 
of far-reaching communitarisation, since 
national competences in foreign and secu-
rity policy would be transferred to the ESC. 
Its policy remit could include the three 
CFSP instruments: the common position, the 
joint action and the common strategy. Up till 
now, these have had to be adopted un-
animously in most cases. It is expected that 
such an ESC would enable the EU to act 
more far-reachingly and rapidly, provided 
that interests and positions converge. In 
this scenario, the High Representative could 
(analogously to the United Nations) assume 
the role of Secretary-General. The EEAS 
would then act as the General Secretariat 
and thus meet as far as possible the tasks it 
has been set by the Treaty. Even though the 
debate on strategic autonomy for Europe in 
accordance with the EU’s global strategy is 
currently gaining momentum, it seems un-
certain whether it will be able to initiate 
reforms. National forces of inertia dominate 
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many member states, making Treaty changes 
seem unrealistic. This model will therefore 
not be feasible in the foreseeable future. 
However, even with more modest integra-
tion ambitions, it will be difficult to use 
an ESC to remedy the shortcomings of EU 
external relations and promote integration 
in this policy area. It would need to be 
clarified whether and how the ESC could 
be integrated into the EU’s institutional 
structure, who wants and should belong to 
it, what it should be responsible for, and 
how it should take its decisions. 
Position vis-à-vis the EU’s 
Institutional Structure 
A look at the existing institutional structure 
of the CFSP underlines that the ESC would 
intensify a key problem in the EU’s external 
action, especially in the first scenario. There 
is already a plenitude of bodies that shape 
EU external relations from both a strategic 
and an operational perspective. A European 
Security Council without executive powers 
risks duplicating these structures. 
In the institutional structure of EU exter-
nal relations, the ESC would probably stand 
alongside the Political and Security Com-
mittee (PSC). In accordance with Article 38 
of the Treaty on European Union, the PSC 
normally meets twice a week to prepare 
decisions on CFSP issues and to oversee the 
conduct of operations under the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Since 
all EU members are represented in the 
CFSP, the PSC would be maintained and be 
complemented by the ESC – which would, 
however, not be part of the CFSP structures. 
One problem with this constellation is that 
the ESC would further advance and “for-
malise” the already discernible tendency 
towards informalising decision-making 
structures in foreign and security policy. 
Thus constructed, the ESC would potentially 
have further negative consequences: dif-
fusing responsibilities, creating more insti-
tutional blockades and perpetuating the 
already pressing issue of coherence in EU 
external relations. Establishing a new 
centre of gravity for foreign policy outside 
EU institutions also raises the question 
of the tasks that the High Representative 
and the EEAS created by the Lisbon Treaty 
would perform within this framework. 
However, the Lisbon Treaty does not 
provide for a European Security Council. 
Under current legal conditions, the ESC 
would therefore inevitably have to be lo-
cated outside the institutional framework 
of the EU’s external relations. In essence, 
the body recommended by Germany and 
France could only be embedded in the EU 
system by means of a treaty revision. 
Membership 
The establishment of a European Security 
Council is likely to be particularly difficult 
for the smaller EU member states. This 
would be the case if the PSC, in which they 
have a seat and vote, were devalued in fa-
vour of the new body, in which, depending 
on the representation and rotation pro-
cedures chosen, they may not be represented. 
The question of ESC membership must 
therefore be clarified upfront so as to avoid 
deepening the fault lines within the EU. 
The United Nations could provide a point 
of reference for representation in a future 
ESC. Of its 193 member states, 15 are rep-
resented on the Security Council, including 
the five permanent members: the United 
Kingdom, France, Russia, China and the US. 
The non-permanent members are elected by 
the UN General Assembly from among the 
UN member states for a term of two years, 
on a regional basis. Three seats are allocated 
to African countries, two each to Asian, 
Latin American and Western European 
countries and one to Eastern European coun-
tries. 
In terms of figures, there is one seat on 
the UN Security Council per 12.86 member 
states. With a future EU of 27 member 
states, the ESC would consist of just one to 
three members by analogy. For purposes of 
representation, this is not plausible. Never-
theless, it is advisable to keep the number 
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of members manageable (probably between 
six and nine), to apply a regional key, and 
to set a time limit on activities within the 
EU Security Council. The EU would have 
to accept, however, that if it renounced per-
manent members, there would as a result 
be phases in the rotation during which the 
Security Council consists exclusively of 
smaller EU states. How this might affect its 
legitimacy inside and outside the EU, and 
what effects it might have on its executive 
competence, cannot be anticipated. Thus, 
the idea of a Directorate looks more attrac-
tive in terms of its capacity to act and en-
force agreements. Medium-sized and smaller 
member states would be grouped around 
this Directorate, and would be represented 
in the ESC by rotation. However, many 
member states may not agree that Germany 
and France should be given such a promi-
nent position. There is therefore a risk that 
many member states would reject the ESC. 
Voting Procedure: Right of Veto – 
Unanimity – Majority Decisions? 
As in the United Nations Security Council, 
the voting procedure in the ESC would be 
crucial. As the victors of the Second World 
War (or their successors), the five perma-
nent members of the UN Security Council 
have a right of veto and thus special pow-
ers. Each of these States can prevent a 
decision by the Security Council. Through 
this privilege, the UN Charter takes into 
account the real balance of power in inter-
national politics, despite the legal equality 
of all members in the General Assembly. It 
thus gives major powers a special respon-
sibility. In return, the major powers give 
political weight to the actions of the United 
Nations. 
Similar considerations are likely to 
underpin the reflections on the ESC voting 
procedure. It cannot be based on a unanim-
ity requirement, precisely because the 
application of this principle by the EU in 
the CFSP area limits Europe’s capacity to 
act. Instead, variants of majority decision-
making procedures will have to be used, 
with quorums if need be. Increasing the 
ESC’s political weight will mean granting 
preferential status to those European states 
whose ambitions and resources make them 
particularly responsible for Europe’s ability 
to act in foreign policy. They could be privi-
leged either by a permanent non-rotating 
seat or by a veto position when voting. Such 
a practice, however, would clash with the 
wish to provide the most extensive repre-
sentation possible of Europe’s states, and 
carries the risk of leading to a two (or more) 
speed European foreign policy. European 
foreign policy would thus become more 
exclusive or “French”, through both finan-
cial contributions and participation in 
operations. When the Permanent Struc-
tured Cooperation (PESCO) was being devel-
oped, France already pleaded for an ambi-
tious implementation of cooperation and 
demanded more commitment to common 
defence from its EU partners. However, 
whether Paris would be prepared to Euro-
peanise its own seat on the UN Security 
Council in the medium term remains to be 
seen. The pressure would certainly increase 
with an ESC. 
Europe’s Role on the 
UN Security Council 
The ESC has a further purpose: in the long 
term, so the Chancellor’s statements sug-
gest, the European Security Council is to 
strengthen Europe’s role on the UN Security 
Council. She has proposed, for example, 
that the non-permanent seats of EU mem-
bers be developed into European seats. 
Since the Maastricht Treaty entered into 
force, the EU as such has been able to act at 
the international level and express its views 
on conflicts, human rights or other issues. 
However, it remains to be seen how far this 
“Europeanisation” can and will go: coordi-
nating respective national positions on the 
UN Security Council with those of the Euro-
pean partners should be a matter of course 
in coherent external action and is already 
being practised. However, as the EU is not a 
full member of the UN, it would not be pos-
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sible to establish non-permanent European 
seats (in the sense of EU seats) within the 
framework of the existing procedure. The 
EU has had “extended observer status” in 
the United Nations General Assembly since 
May 2011, but it does not have the right to 
vote. In other words, this is where the Ger-
man initiative will reach its legal limits. 
Finally, another political caveat must 
be added: the idea of an EU seat on the UN 
Security Council would be meaningful and 
reasonable above all as a permanent seat 
to replace the UK and French seats. It could 
significantly increase the EU’s influence in 
international politics and underline Europe’s 
will to shape its external relations inde-
pendently of others. Regardless of political 
resistance from Paris and London, however, 
an EU seat would only be conceivable as 
part of the comprehensive reform of the UN 
Security Council that has been pursued for 
some 25 years. As part of this reform, other 
regional organisations should also be given 
a seat on the Security Council. 
German Foreign Minister Maas last spoke 
in favour of reforming the UN Security 
Council in his speech to the UN General 
Assembly in September 2018. The Council, 
he pointed out, had hardly changed since 
1945, even though the world’s population 
had tripled and the number of UN members 
almost quadrupled: “We should stop beat-
ing around the bush and finally start real 
negotiations on Security Council reform, 
as the vast majority of the member states 
has wanted for a long time”. Since the early 
1990s, reform has been discussed again and 
again. The G4 countries Brazil, Germany, 
India and Japan, for example, have sug-
gested increasing the number of both per-
manent and temporary seats. 
Relationship with the 
UN Security Council 
Even though the ESC seems to be conceived 
ostensibly as an instrument of the CFSP, 
the (perhaps unintentional) name analogy 
to the United Nations Security Council sug-
gests that the ESC would have similar struc-
tures, tasks and instruments as well as a con-
nection to the UN body. This raises a ques-
tion that must be answered if a European 
Security Council is established: what is its 
relationship to the United Nations Security 
Council? 
According to Article 24 of the UN Char-
ter, its Security Council bears primary 
responsibility for maintaining international 
peace and security. Its area of activity is 
therefore not geographically restricted. Al-
though Article 52ff of the Charter provides 
for “regional arrangements or agencies” 
which may implement regional measures 
for the maintenance of international peace 
and security, these are subject to the prin-
ciples and structures of the UN Charter and 
are thus not autonomous, let alone com-
peting, organisations. Even if a European 
Security Council restricted its activities 
to Europe, this requirement would not be 
removed. Consequently, this new body 
could not claim any independent legitimacy 
beyond the decision-making of the UN 
Security Council. This also applies to the 
Franco-German agreement, whose aim is to 
strengthen Europe’s role in the world, i.e. 
to have an impact beyond Europe in terms 
of security policy. 
The relationship between the two Security 
Councils could be even more difficult when 
it comes to authorising peacekeeping, which 
is the domain of the UN Security Council: 
if the latter detects a threat to international 
security, a breach of peace or an act of 
aggression, it has a whole range of possible 
responses at its disposal. 
It is unlikely that the UN Security Coun-
cil would delegate these tasks concerning 
the European continent or European neigh-
bourhood to the envisaged European Secu-
rity Council, as this would considerably 
weaken its key position in the UN system 
and in international politics as a whole. 
Moreover, all five permanent members 
regard this exposed institutional role as an 
expression of their special power status in 
international politics. They will not want 
to abandon it, as can be seen from the fruit-
less debates on reforming the UN Security 
Council to date. Depending on the form 
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that the crisis management takes, Europe’s 
security action in this policy area would 
therefore have to be authorised by the UN 
Security Council. This in turn would give 
the three Security Council members, the 
USA, China and Russia, an explicit veto 
position on European foreign and security 
policy issues. It is highly doubtful that this 
is what the Franco-German proposal in-
tends. 
Even if European policy were to accept 
this form of political subordination, experi-
ence has shown that such an institutional 
dualism would require lengthy negotia-
tions. In this respect, the German side would 
have to specify what is meant by “increased 
capacity to act” and “faster action”. Both 
terms suggest that the European Security 
Council should be more than a loose multi-
lateral consultation forum, and that it 
should have executive powers. However, its 
decisions would not be binding on the UN 
Security Council. Not only would the latter’s 
legal primacy thus be unchallenged, any 
kind of imperative mandate of the Euro-
pean Security Council vis-à-vis the two 
European members of the UN Security Coun-
cil would also not be politically enforce-
able. 
Conclusions 
The German proposal to create a European 
Security Council has so far remained vague, 
and little has been set out in detail. Such a 
project is controversial among EU members. 
The German idea can only be successfully 
implemented if EU member states’ gain in 
capacity for decision-making and action 
compensates for their loss of sovereignty 
in foreign and security policy. However, in 
view of the rather unenthusiastic attitude 
towards integration by many member 
states, it is obvious that any ESC project 
should not be conceived as a quantum leap 
in integration policy. At best, the German 
proposal can therefore aim to establish a 
foreign and security policy leadership 
group. If this group was removed from the 
EU framework, it would additionally be 
possible to benefit from the contributions 
and skills of the UK or Norway, for exam-
ple. Nevertheless, such an approach risks 
weakening the CFSP/CSDP. For this reason, 
the German Government should consider 
whether its plan to extend majority voting 
in EU foreign policy is not in fact better 
suited to increasing the EU’s capacity to 
make decisions than establishing an ESC. 
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